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Abstract 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a rigorous, end-to-end methodology for modeling culture 
as networks of ideas that are distributed among members of a population. The method, Cultural 
Network  Analysis (CNA),  represents  an  interdisciplinary  synthesis  of  techniques  drawn  from  the 
fields of cognitive anthropology, cultural and cognitive psychology, naturalistic decision making, and 
decision  analysis.  CNA  is  used  to  develop  cultural  models  for  groups  and  populations,  typically 
depicted as a network representation of the culturally shared concepts, causal beliefs, and values 
that influence key decisions. CNA can be usefully employed for a variety of applications, including 
the  design  of  tools  to  support  multinational  collaborative  planning  and  decision  making,  the 
development  of  situated  cultural  training  programs,  and  characterizing  the  cognition  of  target 
audiences to support strategic communications campaigns. 
Introduction 
An inherent challenge in understanding behavior in other cultures rests in gathering, analyzing, and 
representing  the  relevant  cultural  concepts,  beliefs,  and  values  that  drive  decisions  in  those 
populations. In this chapter, we present Cultural Network Analysis (CNA) as a broad approach that 
aids in providing the most relevant cognitive aspects of cultural groups for decision influence. CNA 
comprises a collection of methodologies for eliciting, analyzing, and representing the beliefs, values, 
and  cognitive  concepts  that  are  shared  by  members  of  cultural  groups.  This  paper  provides  a 
detailed  description  of  CNA,  including  its  applications  to  multinational  collaboration,  cultural 
training, and strategic communications. 
The fields of psychology and anthropology have been increasingly challenged by the separation of 
the study of culture and the study of the mind. The interdisciplinary field of culture and cognition 
has emerged as a response to this challenge (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Hutchins, 1995; Nisbett, 
2003; Sperber, 1985). The cognitive revolution that began in the late 1950s influenced the fields of 
psychology and anthropology, leading to the development of cognitive psychology and cognitive 
anthropology  (D'Andrade,  1981;  Gardner,  1984).  These  fields  have  since  progressed  with  little 
interaction.  Cognitive  psychologists  have  focused  on  the  fundamental  building  blocks  or Cultural Network Analysis 
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“architecture” of cognition, largely ignoring the effects of content. Cognitive anthropologists have 
focused on the  content of  cognition,  seeking to  describe  and  explain  knowledge  that  is  shared 
among members of cultural groups. 
The challenge facing these fields is rooted in a twin set of ideas that are pressuring researchers 
within  each  field  to  reconsider  the  significance  of  the  other.  In  cognitive  psychology,  cultural 
variations in what were previously presumed to be universal aspects of the cognitive architecture 
have surfaced. These finds suggest that much of the work in cognitive psychology could potentially 
turn out to be ethnographical, rather than architectural in nature (Nisbett et al., 2001). For their 
part, cognitive anthropologists have been faced with a growing awareness that there are widespread 
commonalities  in  cognitive  organization  that  point  to  the  existence  of  some  form  of  cognitive 
architecture, and that more recent cognitive models of knowledge acquisition, organization, and 
change could prove useful in developing explanations for those commonalities (Boyer, 1994).  
There  is  also  a  third  set  of  developments  that  offers  the  potential  to  further  accelerate  an 
interdisciplinary culture and cognition program. Work in naturalistic decision making and related 
areas have helped to promote a growing interest in field research within cognitive psychology. This 
progressive movement of cognitive psychology into the field has led to the adoption of perspectives 
and methods that overlap significantly with those of cognitive anthropologists, yet retain a distinctly 
psychological emphasis on core cognitive functions, such as decision making, planning, sensemaking, 
adaptation, and coordination (Klein, 1998; Klein et al., 2003). Cognitive field researchers thus have a 
key role to play in shaping the direction of investigations into culture and cognition, with particular 
emphasis on research that aims to support the cultural challenges faced by domain practitioners. 
Culture as Distributions of Knowledge 
Within  cognitive  anthropology,  culture  is  typically  defined  as  involving  shared  knowledge.  One 
specific  theoretical  approach  to  culture  that  characterizes  culture  in  terms of  knowledge  is  the 
epidemiological view. Here, “epidemiology” is used in the general sense of describing and explaining 
the  statistical  distributions  of  any  property  within  a  population.  Cultural  epidemiology  regards 
culture in terms of the ideas that are widely distributed throughout a population (Sperber, 1996). 
The starting point from this view is to recognize that individual minds contain vast amounts of 
mental content. People typically use the word idea to refer to any content of the mind, including 
conceptions of how things are and of how things should be. Networks of ideas are often referred to 
as folk theories or mental models. Such networks constitute peoples’ explanations for how things 
work, and result in judgments and decisions that influence their behaviour (Gentner & Stevens, 
1983).  Furthermore,  the  specific  nature  of  a  person’s  mental  models  depends  heavily  on  their 
cultural background (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). The emphasis on “ideas” or content knowledge is 
consistent with work in cognitive field research and naturalistic decision making that has consistently 
found experiences and mental models to have a primary influence on real-world decision making. 
The  research  from  this  community  clearly  identifies  the  contents  of  cognition,  as  opposed  to 
cognitive processes often studied in laboratory experiments (such as working memory), as the major 
driving force of decisions and behaviour.  
As  implied  by  the  name,  mental models  reside  inside  the  heads of  individuals.  However, when 
people communicate with each other and otherwise shape their environment, their mental models Cultural Network Analysis 
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leave observable traces in the form of physical artifacts and representations, including ephemeral 
traces such as speech and non-verbal gestures (Sperber, 1996). People who come into contact with 
others’  external  traces  generate  associated  thoughts,  and  so  they  produce  mental  models  that 
resemble one another. Mental models can spread widely throughout a population and persist for 
long time periods, becoming “cultural” in the sense of being shared by many of its members across 
space and time. Cultural models represent these shared networks of ideas. 
To take a concrete example, consider Figures 1 and 2 that illustrate American and British cultural 
models of planning. The set of ideas represented in Figures 1 and 2 were extracted from a study 
comparing American and British concepts of quality plans (Rasmussen et al., in press). As shown, a 
cultural model of collaborative planning contains a group’s common concepts as well as their shared 
understanding of the causal relationships between concepts, i.e. the antecedents and consequences 
of planning activities and their outcomes. The cultural model influences communal expectations for 
how planning should unfold and provides a framework for individual selection of behaviors and goals 
within  collaborative  planning  situations.  Consider  Figure  2,  for  instance.  It  depicts  a  number of 
shared ideas among British planners using circles, lines, and color. These ideas include concepts such 
as “plan complexity” and “flexible execution,” represented as circles. The figure also depicts shared 
causal ideas such as the idea that complex plans decrease the ability to execute flexibly. These are 
represented as lines in the figure, with +/- indicating the direction of the causal belief. Finally, Figure 
2 portrays ideas of desired states or value using color, as well as a logical flow across desired states. 
Flexible execution is a good thing, something a plan should support. On the other hand, a plan with 
many assumptions is something to be avoided.  
 
Figure 1: U.S. cultural model of planning 
Holding this culturally-shared mental model is likely to have fairly strong consequences for how 
individuals from the group will decide and act in relevant situations. For example, if it is commonly 
held that detailed specifications of intent and rationale in a plan will improve the capability of 
executors to adapt the plan in order to meet changing conditions, and the ability to adapt is an Cultural Network Analysis 
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important value, then planning team members would be expected to focus on those components of 
the plan. Furthermore, multinational partners who attempt to collaborate while being guided by 
different cultural models may well find themselves frustrated and confused. For example, American 
planners  who  are  focused  on  developing  detailed  actions  so  as  to  promote  synchronization  in 
execution may find themselves wondering why their British counterparts are still talking about goals. 
 
Figure 2: U.K. cultural model of planning 
At this point, it is useful to summarize and define a few related terms. First, the term culture refers 
to  mental  models,  and  other  contents  of  the  mind,  that  are  distributed  across  members  of  a 
population over a period of time. It also includes the resulting behaviors and other traces that foster 
the prolonged survival of shared ideas by providing “habitats” for them (Berger & Heath, 2005).  
Cultural group refers to a set of people that hold shared networks of ideas, whereas a social group 
consists of people who interact with one another. Traditionally, members of groups were connected 
in many different spheres, including being neighbors, engaging in the same work, and participating 
in the same social and religious activities. High overlap in experiences like those, clearly leads to 
shared ideas within a large number of domains. Hence, there was little difference between people’s 
social groups and their cultural groups. More and more, people often identify with an increasingly 
wide assortment of groups that vary considerably in aspects such as purpose, size, and cohesion. 
Modern social groups may be best defined and described using tools such as social network analysis. 
Similarly,  cultural  groups  are  defined  and  described  using  cultural  network  analysis.  Figure  3 
provides an abstract representation of these two distinct levels of analysis. Figure 3 illustrates a 
network of people who also hold shared networks of ideas. 
Generally, the size of a cultural group will depend on the cultural domain, that is, the kind and topic 
of knowledge of interest. This reflects the fact that some ideas are spread very widely among human 
populations, whereas others are much more narrowly held. Further, we sometimes use cultural 
knowledge in place of culture to refer to the networks of ideas for which there is some level of 
concordance among members in the cultural group.  Cultural Network Analysis 
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Finally, cultural model refers to an external representation of a culture that is constructed by a 
researcher. A cultural model represents a consensus of the mental models for a particular cultural 
group and domain.  
 
Figure 3: Cultural networks of ideas are distributed among members of cultural groups 
Why Cultural Models? 
Cultural  models  are  formal  descriptions  of  the  knowledge  possessed  by  members  of  particular 
groups. Cultural models describe and represent how the world is understood by the members of 
these  cultural  groups.  A  key  premise  is  that  cultural  knowledge  comprises  many  networks  of 
causally-interconnected ideas. These mental models become activated within particular situations to 
drive thinking and decision making, and can change under suitable conditions. Cultural models also 
seek to account for relationships between cultural knowledge and social networks, and cultural 
change.  Cultural  dynamics  across  social  networks  is  especially  useful  for  modeling  shared 
understanding  among  multinational  partners,  as  well  as  anticipating  effects  in  communications 
campaigns. 
Cultural Models vs. Cultural Dimensions 
Cultural psychologists have often conceptualized culture in terms of lists of domain general, stable 
traits,  such  as  individualist-collectivist  value  orientations  (Hofstede,  2001;  Schwartz,  1994).  The 
intent  of  this  program  is  to  find  a  core  set  of  dimensions  for  characterizing  cultures  that  are 
important across a wide variety of domains. The motive is to provide a priori, purely analytical 
predictions about cultural groups that are widely applicable to many particular problems. There is 
some evidence at this point that general cultural dimensions may not be applicable across situations. 
For example, Osland & Bird (2000) point to a number of cultural paradoxes that arise in particular 
contexts from cultural characterization in terms of general value dimensions. One compelling reason 
offered for such paradoxes is that the relative importance of values varies depending on the nature 
of the situation. Osland & Bird refer to this phenomenon as “value trumping.” From a cultural Cultural Network Analysis 
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models perspective, cultural dimensions provide an initial characterization of important values that 
may be relevant towards understanding members of a culture in specific contexts. However, they do 
not provide an understanding of what values will be most salient in what contexts. This suggests that 
it  can  be  preferable  to  begin  cultural  analysis of  a  new  domain  in  a more exploratory  fashion, 
allowing the dimensions of value to emerge from the analysis (Sieck et al., in press). In addition, 
much research involving cultural dimensions tends to rely on the scientists’ theories concerning the 
implications of value differences on causal beliefs, other values, or actions. The approach generally 
results in explanations that mix scientific concepts with cultural ideas. Cultural models instead aim to 
directly represent the various relevant cultural ideas and their interrelations, as held by members of 
the cultural group. 
Cultural Models vs. Cognitive Customs 
A  more  recent  trend  within  culture  and  cognition  in  psychology  has  been  to  move  beyond 
knowledge contents, and study national differences in cognitive processes such as reasoning and 
decision making (Norenzayan et al., 2002; Yates et al., 2002). For example, Nisbett et al. (2001) 
found differences between Western and South-East Asian populations in the extent to which they 
tended to rely on analytic and logical versus holistic and dialectical modes of thought. Yates et al. (in 
press) found Chinese to generate fewer arguments, and recruit a more polarized set of arguments 
than U. S. or Japanese participants. Corroborating these thinking modes or “cognitive customs,” 
regarding argument recruitment, the Chinese were also consistently found to be more overconfident 
than U. S. or Japanese participants. This body of work is important in establishing that the mental 
representations studied by culture and cognition researchers should not be limited to the contents 
of cognition, but must ultimately include representations that govern thinking processes per se.  
On the other hand, cognitive field researchers have repeatedly reported that the cognitive processes 
studied in laboratory experiments do not appear to be nearly as influential on real-world decision 
making as content knowledge in the form of episodic experiences and well-formed mental models 
(Phillips et al., 2004). The research from this community clearly identifies the contents of cognition 
as the major driving force of decisions. General cognitive processes may explain considerably less 
variance  than  content,  at  least  in  naturalistic  situations.  Even  within  laboratory  settings,  some 
researchers have shown the important influence of cultural content knowledge on decision making 
(Briley  et  al.,  2000).  Nevertheless,  we  do  expect  that  cognitive  customs  will  prove  important, 
especially  for  understanding  mechanisms  underlying  cultural  change.  Only,  we  expect  that  the 
research  on  cognitive  customs  could  benefit  from  placing  a  greater  emphasis  on  content.  For 
example, content in the form of epistemological beliefs and other kinds of meta-knowledge likely 
contribute  much  to  the  cognitive  customs  of  particular  cultural  groups,  especially  at  the 
macrocognitive level. Such meta-knowledge includes folk theories about how certain macrocognitive 
processes function, e.g., mental models of negotiation or collaborative decision making. 
Kinds of Cultural Domains 
Mental models are naturally domain specific since they pertain to the workings of particular artifacts 
and  natural  processes.  Furthermore,  mental  models  can  vary  across  cultures  in  ways  that  are 
constrained only by the domain itself and any cognitive universals that ground shared understanding 
across humanity (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). A cultural model represents a consensus of the mental Cultural Network Analysis 
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models for a particular cultural group and domain. This leads to a question about the kinds of 
domains for which mental models, and by extension, cultural models exist. 
Most work on mental models has focused on representations in the physical domain, including folk 
theories of artifacts like thermostats (Kempton, 1986) and folk theories of biological systems (Atran, 
1998). For example, Kempton (1986) found that some people held mental models of thermostats 
that included the idea that turning a thermostat to a higher setting causes a room’s temperature to 
rise at a faster rate (a “valve model”). Others held a correct “threshold model,” in which the room 
heats at a constant rate until the threshold is reached. Furthermore, Kempton found that those with 
valve models tended to adjust their thermostats on a more continual basis, whereas those with 
threshold models tend to set their thermostats and leave them. As another example, Atran, Medin, 
&  Ross  (2005)  found  that  cultural  groups’  mental  models  of  plant/animal  interactions  in  the 
rainforest were consistent with the environmental impact of those groups. 
People  also  possess  mental  models  that  pertain  to  the  psychological  and  social  domains.  Most 
fundamentally,  people  have  theories  about  the  workings  of  other  people’s  minds  (Gopnik  & 
Wellman, 1994). People have mental models about negotiation and collaborative decision processes 
(McHugh et al., 2008; Van Boven & Thompson, 2003). Teammates have mental models of teamwork 
(Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Security forces have mental models of crowds (Sieck et al., in press). 
Just as in the physical domain, there is some evidence that mental models in the psychological and 
social domains guide perceptions and decisions. For example, Van Boven & Thompson (2003) found 
that  negotiators  who  reached  optimal  settlements  had  mental  models  that  reflected  greater 
understanding of the payoffs and processes than those who did not reach optimal settlements.  
Although cognitive field research and cognitive anthropology have informed each other’s theory and 
methods, they remain distinct in terms of the domains that each pursues. For example, cognitive 
anthropological studies have aimed at describing and representing folk theories in domains such as 
kinship,  subsistence,  marriage,  plant  names,  diseases,  and  ghosts.  Cognitive  field  research  has 
instead emphasized the study of mental models and experiences that support the decision making 
and other cognitive functions of experts working in complex, high-stakes domains. 
Cultural Network Analysis 
Cultural Network Analysis (CNA) refers to a collection of methodologies for building cultural models. 
CNA includes methods to: 
  elicit the mental models of a sample of individuals within the population, 
  analyze the mental models in terms of their culturally-shared elements across individuals 
and consolidate the elements as cultural models, and 
  represent the cultural models in accessible format for a variety of uses. 
CNA is an approach for building external cultural models that have been extracted from the group. 
CNA is based on a view of culture as comprising networks of ideas, shared to some degree within the 
populations under investigation. CNA builds on a synthesis of conceptually related methods for 
knowledge elicitation, analysis, and representation that stem from the diverse fields of naturalistic 
decision making,  cognitive  anthropology,  cognitive psychology,  marketing,  and  decision analysis. Cultural Network Analysis 
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None of these fields alone offers a comprehensive, end-to-end approach for cultural modeling. CNA 
fills that gap.  
Cultural  Network  Analysis  encompasses  both  qualitative,  exploratory  analysis,  and  quantitative, 
confirmatory analysis. In exploratory CNA, concepts and other mental model elements are extracted 
from qualitative sources, such as interviews and open source media (web news, blogs, email), with 
little presupposition regarding the elicited contents. A primary goal of exploratory CNA is to develop 
an initial understanding of the concepts and characteristics that are culturally relevant within the 
domain. Qualitative analysis and representation at this stage yield insights that can be captured in 
initial cultural models. Qualitative cultural models reflect the “universe” of ideas for the cultural 
group;  that  is,  they  seek  to  capture  all  relevant  ideas  mentioned.  Influence  diagrams  are  an 
important representation format for cultural models, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Qualitative 
analysis may be all that is needed for some applications.  
Exploratory CNA also generates hypotheses and a wealth of material for constructing structured 
data collection in a confirmatory CNA. Confirmatory CNA serves to test the structure of previously 
developed qualitative cultural models, as well as to elaborate the models with quantitative data 
concerning the prevalence of ideas in the population(s) of interest. In confirmatory CNA, structured 
interviews, field experiments, and automated semantic mining of web-based sources are used to 
obtain  systematic  data  that  is  more  amenable  to  statistical  analysis.  Statistical  models  used  by 
cognitive anthropologists and market researchers are employed to assess the patterns of agreement 
and  derive  statistics  describing  the  distribution  of  concepts,  causal  beliefs,  and  values.  Finally, 
influence  diagram  representations  of  the  cultural  models  are  constructed  that  illustrate  the 
statistical  properties,  as  well  as  the  qualitative  information.  Formal  quantitative  representation 
makes it possible to use cultural models in a variety of applied contexts. 
Exploratory CNA 
Elicitation 
A mental model is a person’s intuitive explanation about how something works, and the explanation 
consists of an inter-related set of concepts, beliefs about causality, and values. Hence, in order to 
elicit a mental model in an interview, one needs to find ways to prompt the respondent to verbalize 
those key elements in great detail. Researchers from various fields have been working the issue, and 
considerable progress has been made regarding specific lines of probing and other techniques to 
tease out mental models. It is important to note that such interviews are often semi-structured, and 
tend to be highly dynamic, intercultural interactions. Actually conducting such interviews requires 
considerable  skill  that  goes  well  beyond  developing  guides  to  support  a  particular  line  of 
questioning. 
An example of mental model elicitation is provided in a study examining the cultural knowledge and 
understandings related to diabetes causation in a Native American community (Garro, 2000). The 
researchers conducted interviews following an “explanatory model framework” (Kleinman, 1978). All 
of  the  participants  were  members  of  the  Anishinaabe  community  who  had  been  previously 
diagnosed with diabetes. The researchers ensured that the following aspects of their experiences 
were covered in the interview: 
  The cause of their illness Cultural Network Analysis 
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  Why it started and when it did 
  The history of the illness 
  The kinds of effects it has 
  Possible and appropriate treatments for the illness 
Participants were also encouraged to talk more generally about possible causes and ways of dealing 
with diabetes, and to answer additional related questions that arose from the responses given. 
Based on the results, Garro constructed a graphical outline of the culturally available understandings 
relevant to a cultural schema for sickness. The outline organized hierarchically the most common 
explanations  of  illness  mentioned  in  the  interviews.  First,  the  different  types  of  sicknesses  and 
sickness explanations  were  identified.  The  identity and  labels  for  these  explanations  were  both 
mentioned  explicitly  and  referenced  implicitly  in  the  different  types  of  causes  and  ‘treatments’ 
mentioned. After having inferred the major types of sicknesses, the causes, or perceived causes, 
were sorted into sickness categories. The level of detail and abstraction of the cause descriptions 
was dictated by the amount of information made available by informants.  
In  a  medical  illness  domain  like  “diabetes,”  the  general  direction  of  peoples’  subjective  values 
regarding the disease state is probably fairly transparent (i.e. a cultural preference to avoid the 
disease state exists). However, that transparency does not necessarily translate to other domains, or 
even to various treatment options and effects within the diabetes domain. In such cases, values and 
objectives can be elicited directly, along with the causal beliefs that link more fundamental values 
with the means intended to achieve them (Gutman, 1982; Keeney, 1994). The essential idea of such 
“value-focused thinking” is to ask why a particular objective is important in order to elicit the more 
fundamental  values  that  are  anticipated  in  consequence.  Interview  approaches  like  this  are 
sometimes termed “laddering” in the marketing literature (Reynolds & Gutman, 1988). 
These same questioning strategies that have been used to elicit physical and biological products and 
processes can also be used to elicit mental models of social and cognitive functions and processes, 
such as collaborative planning and decision making (Rasmussen et al., in press). The data underlying 
the  cultural  models  illustrated  in  Figures  1  and  2  were  elicited  using  an  explanatory  models 
framework combined with a value-focused thinking approach in order to capture descriptive and 
prescriptive components of the mental models. In general, an explanatory framework for mental 
models of social-cognitive functions and processes should aim to capture the following: 
  Positive/negative states and outcomes 
  Conceptions of quality in process and outcomes 
  Causal factors that influence the quality concepts 
  Consequences of low/high quality functioning 
  Artifacts, procedures and tools intended to support the natural process 
  Functions of ingrained artifacts 
 An  important  consideration  in  eliciting  knowledge  about  social-cognitive  domains  like 
“collaboration” or “decision making” is the difficulty inherent in discussing abstract concepts. One 
approach  to  achieving  some  concrete  grounding  in  such  abstract  domains  is  to  elicit  specific Cultural Network Analysis 
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incidents on the topic, and use them to tease out clues to participant’s mental models. For example, 
Sieck et al. elicited incidents from Arabs in Lebanon and the US who had participated in protests as a 
means to gain access to Middle Eastern crowd members’ understandings and expectations of how 
crowds work (Sieck et al., 2006). The idea is to elicit a real-lived incident from the participant, and 
then  use  that  concrete  example  as  a  starting  point  for  more  abstract  discussions  of  causality 
introduced through hypotheticals (“What if?” questions). 
Another useful technique for getting at abstract mental models is the “nearest neighbor method” 
(Klein  &  Hoffman,  2008).  This  is  a  useful  method  to  use  when  participants  may  have  difficulty 
articulating their beliefs, such as when they have an understanding and expectations about how 
something  works,  but  that  understanding  is  represented  in  non-verbal  forms.  Respondents  are 
presented  with  cartoons,  diagrams,  other  pictures,  or  vignettes  that  depict  different  possible 
variations of the mental model. The respondent selects the depiction that most closely matches 
their conception, and then explains where and how it does not quite fit. As with the incident-based 
methods,  this  approach  can  be  valuable  for  providing  some  common  ground  between  the 
interviewer and respondent, though it is clearly more directive than the open questioning methods. 
Analysis 
In contrast with elicitation, analysis of qualitative data for the specific purpose of characterizing 
mental models has not appeared to be developed in any great detail. In some cases, researchers 
seem to work individually using rather opaque processes to finally emerge with an idiosyncratic 
representation of a cultural model or schema. We have thus been developing our own analytical 
procedures with the aims of achieving a traceable, repeatable, and reliable process for extracting 
culturally shared mental models from text. In the most recent application of our process (described 
below) to some interviews we conducted with Afghans, we achieved 95.2% reliability and developed 
fully traceable cultural models.  
The process we have developed starts by conducting an initial coding of transcripts or other data 
records to identify and record local concept-causal belief-value (CBV) chains. Transcripts from all 
participants in the cultural group are analyzed together as a unit. This step is performed by two 
coders working independently. The analysis team then performs a reliability check on the initial 
results, and holds a meeting to establish consensus codes. The reliability check is performed by 
tracking the conflicting codes and total number of codes. Codes are conflicting if the concepts, 
direction, or valence are inconsistent or incompatible. Such conflicts are resolved in the consensus 
meeting, and the issues discussed may include the level of abstraction/detail used to describe the 
CBV chains, appropriate places to divide the causal linkages, any assumptions and inferences the 
analysts are making. The resulting consensus descriptions are used to consolidate the local CBV 
codes into an overall model. This step is generally performed by one analyst. Finally, the team 
members perform independent reviews of the model against the data, and iteratively revise and 
refine until a consensus of the model is achieved. Comments and revisions to the model include 
flagging any concepts reflected in the consensus file that are missing from the model, pointing out 
inconsistencies between the consensus document and model, commenting on the overall level of 
abstraction of the model, and providing suggestions for reorganizing the model to make it clearer, or 
more succinct.  Cultural Network Analysis 
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 The analysis process we use relies on explicit verbalizations by the participants. Other research 
suggests that systematic analysis of the way people talk can offer additional insight into the nature 
of mental models. Metaphors are a linguistic manifestation of tacit knowledge, and hence provide a 
window of access to such difficult-to-verbalize thoughts. Researchers have proposed that metaphor 
is an indispensable part of our ordinary and conventional way of conceptualizing the world and our 
everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
A metaphor consists of the projection of one schema (the source domain of the metaphor) onto 
another  schema  (the  target  domain  of  the  metaphor).  Schmitt  (2005)  proposed  a  systematic 
approach  to  uncovering  the  origins  of  metaphor  models,  the  historically-defined  changes  in 
metaphors  across  time,  and  the  context-sensitivity  of  metaphors.  These  are  dimensions  which, 
according  to  Schmitt,  are  often  overlooked  in  purely  cognitive  anthropological  and  linguistic 
examinations of metaphor. 
As an example use of metaphor analysis for developing a cultural model, Quinn asked American 
husbands and wives to talk about 'marriage' and collected hours and hours of minimally guided 
conversations  with  them  on  that  topic  (Quinn,  2005).  She  then  analyzed  the  data  categorizing 
linguistic  metaphors  into  a  set  of  central  or  commonly  shared  conceptual  metaphors  that  her 
informants used to reason about different aspects of marriage. She extracted metaphors, such as 
“marriage is a journey,” as well as the abstract concepts and values that were being associated with 
each, including 'lastingness', 'sharedness', 'compatibility', and 'difficulty'. Quinn noticed that these 
metaphors, in isolation, did not appear to tell the whole story. She also noticed that her informants 
often  followed  the  same causal  chain  to  reach  their  conclusions.  For  example,  a  certain  causal 
relationship  exists  between  compatibility  and  lastingness.  The  resulting  cultural  schema  that 
describes how Americans reason about marriage, represented as a causal chain in narrative form, is: 
Marriages are successful if they last. In order to last, a marriage must be beneficial, and in order for it 
to be beneficial, its difficulties must be overcome, and this requires effort (Quinn, 2005). 
Graphical Representation 
As  with  analysis,  current  approaches  for  representing  cultural  models  appear  to  be  relatively 
idiosyncratic, or even non-existent. A default approach to representation for CNA might prove quite 
useful, if it could accomplish the following:  
1.  Provide a standard pictorial form that shows the concepts and causal linkages in a manner 
that  can  be  readily  digested  by  end  users  who  need  to  routinely  comprehend  cultural 
models in varied domains 
2.  Permit a direct means of representing the statistical distributions of cultural knowledge, 
rather than just the shared knowledge 
3.  Yield representations in a useful form for developers of intelligent systems 
One  such  representation  format  that  meets  these  requirements  is  an  influence  diagram.  In  an 
influence diagram, each node-link-node combination represents causal influence, in the sense that 
the value of the concept at the beginning of an arrow affects the value of the concept at the arrow’s 
point. Fully-specified influence diagrams can also represent numerical quantities, as described in the 
confirmatory CNA section, but the basic structure is useful as well. Specifically, an influence diagram 
can  present  a  relatively  simple  and  useful  representation  of  an  individual’s  mental  model  of  a 
domain that is related to key judgments and decisions that rely on that mental model. For example, Cultural Network Analysis 
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Bostrom et al. provide an example of an influence diagram that illustrates an expert’s mental model 
of radon, as related to the expert’s judgment concerning risk of lung cancer (Bostrom et al., 1992). 
Sieck and colleagues used an influence diagram to represent an expert mental model of crowd 
functioning, as related to key judgments of threat level and populace attitudes (Sieck et al., in press).  
Likewise, influence diagrams can also be used to represent qualitative cultural models. In this case, 
the diagram represents the complete set of concepts and linkages for all members of each cultural 
group  considered  in  the  analysis.  For  example,  Figures  1  and  2  illustrate  cultural  models  for 
American and British campaign planners, respectively, each of which is related to a key judgment 
concerning the quality of the plan and planning process. As shown, the specific values along which 
such judgments are rendered were found to differ between the two cultural groups, such that the 
Americans rely more heavily on synchronization in judging plan quality, whereas British planners 
focus more on the ability of the plan to support flexible execution (Rasmussen et al., in press). 
Confirmatory CNA 
Elicitation 
Structured  approaches  for  the  elicitation  of  complete  mental  models  have  only  recently  begun 
serious  development.  Most  surveys  and  structured  questionnaires  treat  ideas  as  independent 
entities, and so do not provide any means for revealing their interrelated, network form. There are, 
however, a few studies in which causal relations between concepts have been directly assessed 
(Atran et al., 2005; Garro, 2000; Sieck et al., 2009). For example, Sieck et al. selected twelve security 
force actions and five categories of crowd responses from an earlier qualitative cultural study in 
order to develop a mental models questionnaire. Each security force action was then paired once 
with each crowd member response. For each pair, the participant was asked whether the crowd 
member  behavior  or  attitude  will  increase,  decrease,  or  stay  the  same.  The  purpose  of  these 
questions was to elicit the participants’ causal beliefs between security force actions and crowd 
member behavior. Such causal linkages form the basis of their mental models. More recently, we 
have begun developing questionnaires that permit the analysis of longer causal belief chains. 
Analysis 
One issue with purely qualitative approaches to the development of cultural models is the lack of 
transparency or consistent guidelines in what knowledge was deemed sufficiently shared to include 
in the model. Strauss and Quinn state, “At what point in the continuum of sharedness we decide to 
call  a  given  schema  ‘cultural’  is  simply  a  matter  of  taste,”  (p  122).  Structured,  quantitative 
approaches  are  required  for  testing  the  qualitative  discoveries  about  culturally  shared  mental 
models, and further analyzing and representing their distributions within and between populations. 
Cultural consensus theory and mixture modeling are two statistical methods that can be usefully 
employed to meet those needs.  
Cultural consensus theory is a collection of formal statistical models designed to assess concordance 
in  knowledge  and  beliefs  among  a  set  of  respondents  (Romney  et  al.,  1986).  When  a  cultural 
consensus is found, it provides the consensual responses that indicate culturally shared knowledge 
and estimates of the strength of consensus for those responses. Individuals will also vary in the 
extent to which their responses agree with the consensus, and that variation is captured explicitly 
for  each  individual  as  a measure of “cultural  competence.”  Cultural  competence  should  not  be 
confused  with  expertise,  but  rather  with  the  degree  of  concordance  with  the  culturally  shared Cultural Network Analysis 
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knowledge. The instigating issue that prompted development of the theory was the recognition that 
an anthropologist who goes in to a new culture and asks questions does not know the answers to 
the questions or the cultural competence of the respondents (Romney et al., 1987). An important 
feature  of  CCT  is  that,  assuming  the  data  collection  taps  into  reasonably  well-shared  cultural 
knowledge, then the number of respondents can be quite small, e.g., 10 or fewer respondents. This 
is  important  for  field  research,  which  often  aims  at  understanding  knowledge  within  small 
populations. 
Cultural consensus theory has been applied to research questions in a number of cultural domains, 
including disease concepts and folk theories of disease processes, characterizations of alphabetic 
systems, national consciousness, folk theories of biology and ecology, and others. CCT can be used 
to analyze fixed-format questionnaires (e.g. true-false, fill-in-the-blank, multiple choice, rank order) 
and classification data (e.g. card sort, hierarchical taxonomy). It has also been used to analyze free-
listings of concepts (Ross & Medin, 2005). CCT has most often been used to analyze data on simple 
concepts.  However,  it  has  also  been  successfully  employed  to  analyze  relationships  between 
concepts, such as causes, consequences, and other interactions (Atran et al., 2005; Garro, 2000). 
This use of CCT is critical for the purposes of analyzing mental models.  
Mixture modeling is a statistical technique that is growing in general popularity for a variety of uses, 
and provides a competing approach to CCT for cultural data analysis. Mixture models have been 
applied in many scientific fields, including marketing, biology, medicine, and astronomy. McLachlan 
and Peel (2000) provide a general description of mixture models, along with example applications.  
A mixture model, or “finite mixture model,” is given as a combination of different groups, each 
described by a distinct probability distribution. Mixture models sort through the data and group 
them into sets of relatively homogeneous cases or observations. For concreteness, we describe the 
process in an example application to market segmentation. Finite mixture modeling was used to 
examine whiskey usage in 2218 households (Grun & Leisch, 2007). Information on whiskey type 
(single malt or blend) and 21 specific brands was included in the data set. A mixture of binomial 
distributions was fitted to the data set, and the analysts varied the possible (“finite”) number of 
groups between 1 and 7. Model fitting was conducted using a statistical package called “FlexMix” 
originally developed earlier by one of the authors (Leisch, 2004). FlexMix uses an iterative maximum 
likelihood procedure called the, “EM algorithm,” for model estimation. The best fitting model was 
selected using the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) statistic. BIC suggested that the best fit was 
achieved with 5 groups or segments. The largest segment was not found to consume much whiskey 
on the whole, used a wide variety of brands when they did partake, but avoided single malts. The 
largest  users  consisted  of  about  10%  of  the  sample,  and  were  spread  across  two  groups  best 
delineated by whether they consumed single malt whiskey. 
Mixture modeling has also been successfully used in cultural analysis (Mueller & Veinott, 2008; Sieck 
& Mueller, 2009; Sieck et al., 2009). In this application, the distinct segments resulting from the 
analysis represent cultural groups, i.e., groups defined by the similarity of their ideas. Mueller and 
Veinott (2008) compared the technique with CCT by applying it to some of the same classic cultural 
data sets for which CCT was first used. The primary advantage they found for mixture modeling was 
in the case where CCT does not find a consensus. In that situation, one cannot tell whether there is 
simply  no  pattern  to  the  data,  or  whether  the  data  reflect  multiple  cultural  groups.  Mixture Cultural Network Analysis 
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modeling can also provide a wider number of metrics for assessing the cultural groups within the 
population (Mueller et al., 2007). In particular, we define here the following five cultural metrics as 
essential in characterizing a family of cultural models: 
  Number of cultural models identified  
  Consensus within a model 
  Prevalence of each idea within a model  
  Cultural competence of individuals  
  Distinctiveness between cultural models 
Although these measures stand independently of any particular statistical technique, analyses using 
mixture models provide quantities that can be used to assess each of these metrics. 
Graphical Representation 
We find influence diagrams to be useful for representing quantitative cultural models, and they 
provide  additional  information  to  their  qualitative  counterparts.  When  completely  specified,  an 
influence  would  be  defined  in  terms  of  conditional  probabilities,  where  a  influences  b  if  the 
probability distribution of b conditioned on a is different from the unconditional distribution of b 
(Howard, 1989). The full specification of influences is typically performed by experts in the domain 
who consult external resources and render all the probabilities themselves (Edwards, 1998; Edwards 
&  Fasolo,  2001).  This  process  presents  a  serious  technical  challenge  to  the  expert  and  raises 
questions concerning the reliability and validity properties of the judgments. Fortunately, we do not 
need to require respondents to assess probabilities in order to develop quantitative cultural models. 
That is, although numerical values are incorporated in the final result, the use of influence diagrams 
to  represent  cultural  models  only  requires  that  individuals  be  able  to  convey  the  qualitative 
components and directions of the influences in the diagram. 
In the application of confirmatory CNA, the influence diagram represents the “culturally correct” 
concepts, values, and causal linkages as determined by CCT or mixture modeling for each cultural 
group that was found. Furthermore, the results concerning prevalence of each idea within a group 
are used to populate the numerical probability values in the diagram. The result in this case is a 
summary of not only the shared influence links across the population, but rather the full distribution 
of  ideas, with  probabilities  indicating  the  consensus  on  any  particular  causal  link  (or  node).  An 
example is provided in Figure 4, illustrating a simple quantitative cultural model of Middle Eastern 
crowd functioning, derived using mixture modeling (Sieck et al., 2009). As shown, there is a relatively 
strong consensus (87%) within the represented cultural group that Americans speaking Arabic to 
Middle Eastern crowd members will have a positive effect on the crowd’s attitudes towards the U. S. 
The idea that firing a warning shot will have just the opposite effect is even more prevalent within 
this group (93%). 
Applications of Cultural Network Analysis 
Culture is made up of contagious ideas, that is, ideas that propogate effectively and durably within a 
population  (Sperber,  1996).  Two  broad  objectives  of  research  within  this  cultural  epidemiology 
viewpoint are to: Cultural Network Analysis 
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  Characterize the current distribution of mental models within the cultural group 
  Understand the dynamics of culture 
 
Figure 4: Example of a quantitative cultural model 
A fundamental cultural research program seeks to address why some ideas are more infectious than 
others,  and  to  explain  the  most  widely  distributed  and  long-lasting  ideas  within  a  population. 
Research for practical purposes has a slightly different focus. From a decision-making standpoint, for 
example,  we  recognize  that  many  ideas  may  be  pervasive  but  inconsequential  to  decisions  of 
practical interest (Bostrom et al., 1992; Sperber, 1985). Hence, a decision-centered approach to 
culture and cognition begins with critical judgments and decisions that are made by members of a 
cultural group. Using Cultural Network Analysis, we can then study the networks of ideas that are 
relevant to those decisions in order to answer a host of questions, such as: 
  How are networks of ideas organized in mental models? 
  What is the distribution of mental models in a cultural group? 
  Why are the mental models distributed in that way? 
  How did the distribution get to be that way? 
  How stable are those distributions? 
  In what ways are the distributions changing over time? 
  Why are they changing in that way? 
  What makes some ideas successful in the culture? 
  Why is the culture more vulnerable to some ideas than to others? Cultural Network Analysis 
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This shift in theoretical focus provides an opportunity to enhance the content of existing tools and 
procedures that have been developed to support multinational collaboration, but it also inspires the 
design  of  different  approaches  to  supporting  multinational  collaborations  altogether.  Explicit 
representations of the distribution of implicit knowledge within two cultures can make it possible to 
assess differences and potential similarities between the cultures in question, including in terms of 
knowledge about how people should interact in order to work together effectively. The high-level 
goal here is to promote the development of hybrid cultures in multinational collaborative planning 
and  decision making (Earley & Mosakowski,  2000).  Hybrid  cultures  comprise  a  simplified  set  of 
shared  assumptions,  rules,  expectations,  and  procedures  that  permit  multinational  teams  to 
function effectively. Hybrid cultures develop naturally over time as teams converge on a common 
process of interacting. However, cultural models can be used to inform the design of tools and 
processes that promote the natural process.  
For example, with respect to reconciling the American and British cultural models illustrated in 
Figures 1 and 2, we might consider a collaborative planning tool with functionality, and interfaces 
tailored to support distinct roles by the partners in a coherent, comprehensive coalition planning 
process. In this case, we could ensure that the distinct roles each national partner would be assigned 
to align with the respective nation-specific processes. In particular, this suggests a division of labor 
that has the British members of the team contribute to developing the intent, plan rationale, and the 
logic  between  ends,  ways,  and  means,  whereas  the  Americans  would  focus  on  developing  the 
detailed specification of actions.  
Another design idea is to develop a coalition plan evaluation tool that relies on multinational metrics 
of plan quality. Such a tool would ideally incorporate an automated assessment of plan content 
using an ontological representation of cultural models (Rasmussen et al., in press). The idea is to 
provide measures of plan quality that include value dimensions from each coalition partner (e.g. 
action, rationale specification). Such a tool would provide a concrete basis for discussion among 
planners about evaluations of plans, for example, enable them to explicitly examine and discuss the 
right “mix” of elements to make a good plan. Providing such online feedback to a team about what 
they are trying to accomplish is expected to speed up the natural process of hybrid culture building.  
An explicit representation of the distribution of implicit content knowledge within a culture can also 
serve as a foundation for developing situated cultural training programs (Sieck et al., 2008). Explicit 
cultural models can provide a meaningful basis for inferring otherwise implicit goals and intentions, 
which  is  essential  for  successful  communication.  Whereas  traditional  training  programs  often 
provide  a  set  of  dos  and  don’ts,  training  the  ability  to  infer  intentions  within  a  novel  cultural 
knowledge structure provides a generative platform which can be used in a variety of multinational 
situations.  
Finally, explicit representations of content knowledge within a culture can also serve as a basis for 
composing effective strategic communications. The models of culturally-shared content knowledge 
within a certain domain can serve as a basis for determining what makes for culturally meaningful 
messages. The CNA would allow for making predictions concerning the effectiveness of a message by 
providing the opportunity to assess potential unintended inferences that individuals with a certain 
knowledge structure might make. Specifically, in a cultural models diagram, each concept and causal 
belief represents an opportunity to affect a change in beliefs or concepts. Hence, such diagrams can Cultural Network Analysis 
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provide a basis for determining the content of communications. Messages are created so as to affect 
the values of the most vulnerable concept nodes (i.e. those for which there is the least consensus) 
which then propagate across perceived influences to affect the values of other concepts. These 
effects spread through the cultural knowledge network, ultimately changing the value in overall 
perceptions or cognitions. With this CNA approach, information efforts focus on transmitting the 
most relevant information to affect conceptual change in a way that makes sense within the cultural 
group’s understanding.  
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